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Tipps: Separation of Powers - California Politics

COMMENT
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE
But what's one crocodile's tooth, more or less?
-Shel Silverstein, The Crocodile's Toothache
INTRODUCTION

In November 2005, the voters of California went to the polls for a
special election called by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. I The
Governor called the election so the people of the state could vote on a
quartet of initiatives on a range of topics to "reform" California
government. 2 The proposed initiatives addressed state spending limits,
redistricting, use of union dues for political purposes, and teacher
tenure. 3
The Public Policy Institute of California released a survey on
October 28, 2005, that measured the attitudes of likely voters on a variety
of topics, including the impending special election. 4 Fifty-four percent
of likely voters thought it was a bad idea. s In addition, none of the
Governor's "reform" initiatives enjoyed the support of a majority of the
likely voters that participated in the survey.6 The survey, released two
weeks before the election, proved accurate. The voters of California
I See John Wildemuth and Carla Marinucci, 6.8 Million Expected to Vote Today, S.F.
Chronicle, November 8, 2005, at AI.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 Public Policy Institute of California, Special Survey On Californians and the Initiative
Process 7 (2005), available at http://www.ppic.org/mainlpublication.asp?i=641 (last visited
February 10, 2006). The Public Policy Institute of California is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research
organization that is dedicated to improving public policy in the state.
See
http://www.ppic.org/mainlabout.asp (last visited February 10,2006).
sId. at 38.
6 See id. at 32-33.
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rejected all of the Governor's proposed initiatives. 7
Interestingly, ambivalence toward the issues themselves does not
appear to be the source of the initiatives' defeat. 8 The survey revealed
that voters are indeed concerned about the problems that the Governor's
proposed initiatives were meant to address. 9 For instance, even though a
majority of likely voters opposed the Governor's redistricting initiative,
forty-four percent of those asked felt that California's redistricting
process needs major changes. lO Similarly, sixty-two percent of likely
voters opposed the initiative dealing with state spending limits despite
the fact that sixty-six percent of those same voters believed that major
changes are needed in the way California spends its money. II
Taken together, the results of the survey and the special election
suggest that the voters of California simply did not think that the
initiative process was an appropriate means for dealing with these
issues. 12 Indeed, the Governor himself seems to have conceded this
point; after the election his spokesman claimed that the people of
California had voted against the election itself rather than against the
Governor's ideas.13 The spokesman went on to say that "the governor
very much sees the results as an indication that voters want the problems
of the state to be resolved here in Sacramento by elected officials.,,14
The special election of 2005 was the latest act in a constitutional
drama that has been unfolding for the last 94 years lS and that will
continue to unfold as an integral part of California's future. Since the
advent of the initiative process in California, it has played a key role in
the state's legal and political saga, performing its part alongside the
state's other three constitutional actors-the legislature, the executive,
and the judiciary.
Recognition of this key role has prompted many to refer to the
initiative process in California as a fourth branch of government. 16

7 Mark Martin, Carla Marinucci, and Lynda Gledhill, Californians Say No to
Schwarzenegger S.F. Chron. November 9,2005, at AI.
8 See Public Policy Institute of California, supra note 4 at v.
9 See id.
IO Public Policy Institute of California, supra note 4 at 33.

Illd.

See id. at 38.
John Wildemuth and Carla Marinucci, Governor's Camp Says His Ideas Didn't Lose, S.F.
Chron., November 10,2005, at AI.
14
1d.
15 The initiative process was created in 1911 by an amendment to the state constitution. See
infra part n.B.
16 See John M. Allswang, Initiative & Referendum in California, 1898-1998 1 (2000); see
also Peter Schrag, The Fourth Branch o/Government? You Bet., 41 SANTA CLARA L REv. 937, 941
12
13

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol36/iss2/4

2

Tipps: Separation of Powers - California Politics

2006] SEPARATION OF POWERS-CALIFORNIA POLITICS 187
However, the theoretical implications of this claim remain largely
unexplored. 17 One reason for this is that the state separation of powers
concerns that are implicated by the naming of the initiative power as a
fourth branch of government have not received anywhere near the same
level of scholarly attention that federal separation of powers issues have
received. 18
This Comment seeks to apply the existing principles of California's
separation of powers jurisprudence to the statutory initiative power,
beginning from the premise that this power constitutes a fourth and
autonomous branch of government. Part I describes the initiative process
and how it differs from the manner in which laws are passed by the
legislature. 19 Part II details the theoretical and historical origins of the
initiative power?O Part III identifies the sources of the initiative power
and the conventional legislative process, and it discusses the differing
places ascribed to each in the state's constitutional jurisprudence. 21 Part
IV delineates the existing limits on the initiative power. 22 Part V
identifies the salient principles of the separation of powers in
California. 23 Part VI argues that the lack of a legislative check on the
initiative power allows the initiative to completely subsume the state's
legislative power, which was not the intent when the initiative power was
created. 24 Part VII concludes that the state legislature should play a
meaningful role in the initiative process in order to avoid a conflict with
the separation of powers provision in the state constitution?5
I.

THE INInAnVE PROCESS

The initiative process allows the voters of California (whom the
state constitution terms "the electors .. 26 ) to adopt statutes and

(2001); Gerald F. Uelmen, Handling Hot Potatoes: Judicial Review of California Initiatives After
Senate v. Jones, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 999, 999 (2001).
17 Cf Karl Manheim and Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in
California, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 116S, 1166 (1998).
18 See Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California's Separation of
Powers,SI UCLAL.REV. 1079,1082(2004).
19 See infra notes 26-74 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 7S-124 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 12S-1S7 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes IS8-201 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 202-267 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 268-293 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 294-308 and accompanying text.
26 CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8.
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constitutional amendments independently of the state legislature. 27
Whereas laws enacted by the legislature must travel a long and
complicated path that is often, in the words of one legislator, "difficult
and tortuOUS,,,28 laws enacted by the voters take effect through a
relatively simple procedure of signature-gathering, campaigning, and
finally a popular vote?9 Initiated laws are thus spared the arduous
vetting and amendment processes that legislatively enacted laws must
undergo. 3D These legislative processes allow for a great deal of "critical
shaping" by interested parties on both sides of the partisan aisle?l The
initiative process does not. 32
A.

How A BILL BECOMES

ALA W

The journey of a law passed by the state legislature begins when a
legislator decides that a certain change that is needed to statutory law or
to the state constitution?3 The author then submits the idea to the Office
of the Legislative Counsel, which drafts the actual bill that ostensibly
will enact the proposed change?4 Bill in hand, the author consults with
staff, agencies, advocates, and other organizations to ensure that the bill
contains appropriate language. 35
After the author has completed this first round of vetting, the bill
receives a number and goes immediately to the Rules Committee. 36 The
Rules Committee assigns the bill to the appropriate policy committee
based on the bill's subject matter. 37 The staff of the policy committee,
alongside the author's staff, then analyzes the bill to identify any flaws it
might have and to recommend appropriate changes. 38 Once this analysis
is complete, the committee holds a hearing on the bill, at which it listens
to testimony both for and against the bill and asks whatever questions it
may have. 39
See id.; see also id. art. XVill. §§ 3-4.
Sheila James Kuehl, Either Way You Get Sausages: One Legislator'S View of the Initiative
Process, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1327,1327 (1998).
29 See CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8.
30 See Keuhl, supra note 28 at 1329.
31 See id.
32
Id .
27

28

33

Id. at 1327.

Id .
35 Id. at 1328.
36 Id .
37
Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
34
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If the bill clears the first policy committee, it may then go to a
second policy committee where the analysis and hearing processes are
repeated. 4o A bill that is fiscal-meaning that its implementation will
cost the state money-is sent to the Appropriations Committee which
assesses the impact of that COSt. 41 If the Appropriations Committee is
satisfied, the bill goes to the Floor of the Assembly or Senate (depending
on which house originates the bill) where further analysis, debate, and
possible amendments occur. 42 Once the bill clears the Floor, it then goes
to the other house where the entire process begins again. 43
The Assembly and the Senate consider a bill for six months, during
which time the bill is "poked, prodded, questioned, discussed, debated,
and scrutinized.,,44 At any point along the way, the bill's journey to the
statute books or the constitution may be permanently halted. 45 If a bill
survives passage through both houses of the legislature, it goes to the
governor's desk to be either vetoed or signed into law. 46 If the bill is a
proposed constitutional amendment, it must overcome the final obstacle
of a popular vote before it is adopted. 47
B.

How To PASS A LAW WITHOUT LEGISLATORS

Though it accomplishes the same result as the conventional
legislative process-the adoption of a law or constitutional
amendment-the initiative process does so in a very different fashion. 48
The California Constitution provides that a proposed initiative may be
placed on the ballot by presenting a petition to the Secretary of State
containing the text of the proposed law and a requisite number of
signatures. 49 The California Elections Code sets out the specific
procedural requirements with which the initiative proponents must
comply if the desired law is to arrive safely on the ballot. 50
The initiative process begins when a proponent drafts a proposed
51
law.
The proponent may request the assistance of the Legislative
40
41

42

43
44

45

[d.
See id.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 1329.
See id.

46

!d.

47

[d.

See id.
49 CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(b).
50 See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9000 et seq. (West 2005).
51 California
Secretary
of
State
48
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Counsel in drafting the law but is not required to do SO.52 Once the text
of the law is complete, the proponent submits it to the Attorney General
who prepares a title and summary. 53 The initiative proponent may make
substantive amendments to the law for only fifteen days after
submission. 54 In addition, if the Attorney General decides that the
proposed law requires a fiscal analysis, the Department of Finance and
the Joint Legislative Budget Committee must prepare the analysis within
twenty-five working days of receiving the proposed law. 55
After the proponent has received the official title and summary from
the Attorney General, the petition circulation process can begin.56 The
proponent must collect the required number of signatures within a 150day period. 57 In addition, the initiative must qualify for the ballot at least
131 days before the election in which it will be voted on. 58 Once the
signature-gathering process is complete, the petition is filed with the
appropriate local elections officials. 59 These officials then perform a raw
count of the signatures on the petition and report the number to the
Secretary of State. 60 If less than 100 percent of the required number is
present, the measure immediately fails. 61 If more than 100 percent of the
required number is present, the Secretary of State directs the local
officials to perform a random sample to determine the validity of the
signatures.62 The measure qualifies for the ballot once the Secretary of
State is satisfied that the petition contains the required number of valid
signatures. 63
Because the qualification process is somewhat technical and timesensitive, many initiative proponents employ the services of professional
signature-gathering firms. 64 By paying these firms on a per-signature
basis, initiative proponents can overcome much of the difficulty involved

http://www.ss.ca.gov/e1ections/init~ide.htm

52

(last visited January 29, 2006).

See id.

53

Id .

54

See CAL. ELEc. CODE § 9004 (West 2005).

California Secretary of State Initiative Guide, supra note 51.
Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
55
56

63

See id.

64

Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Democracy? 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 20

(1997).
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in the qualification process. 65 These firms are part of what has come to
be called "the initiative industry.,,66 This term encompasses not only
firms that gather signatures, but also those that draft the proposed law
and perform media consulting services during the campaign for the law's
passage. 67 However, despite the availability of for-profit signaturegathering firms, most measures fail to surmount the obstacles to ballot
qualification. 68
Whereas laws passed by the legislature are subject to input, vetting,
and amendment from a variety of sources, laws passed by initiative
remain in substantially the same form throughout the process. 69
Currently no procedures exist by which to test and weigh the legal
sufficiency or constitutionality of proposed initiatives before they are
placed on the ballot. 70 The role of the Attorney General is expressly
limited to the preparation of a title and summary of the proposed law.7l
The Legislative Counsel has a role in the initiative process only if the
Attorney General happens to be a proponent of an initiative; if this is the
case, it takes over the duties normally performed by the Attorney
General. 72 Even though the Senate and the Assembly may hold hearings
on proposed initiatives, neither body has authority to alter the text of an
initiative in any way.73 Initiatives are thus presented to voters on a takeit-or-Ieave-it basis with language chosen exclusively by the proponent. 74
II.

THE INITIATIVE As THE OPPOSITE OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT

The practical difference between the initiative process and the
conventional legislative process results from a difference in theory. The
initiative process is a form of direct democracy, which allows citizens to
directly exercise lawmaking power. 75
Direct democracy differs
fundamentally from the representative form of government that is

65
66
67
68

See id.
See id.
See id. at 20.
[d. at 19.

Kuehl. supra note 28 at 1329.
See Philip P. Frickey. The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct
Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 421, 438 (1998).
71 See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9002 et seq. (West 2005).
72 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9003 (West 2005).
73 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9007 (West 2005).
74 Kuehl, supra note 28 at 1329.
75 See Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L. I. 1503, 1509 (1990).
69
70
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generally associated with the American system. 76
Whereas
representative government was designed in large part to curb the tyranny
of the majority through the "filtering" of majoritarian preferences,77
direct democracy is meant to fully and unreservedly implement the
popular will. 78 Even though the U.S. Constitution does not provide for
the exercise of direct democracy, California has followed a different path
by placing direct lawmaking power in the hands of its citizens. 79
A.

THE FRAMERS' REJECTION OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

The framers of the U.S. Constitution expressed a preference for
representative government over and against direct democracy by severely
curtailing citizens' participation in the lawmaking process. 80 The
original U.S. Constitution granted the people no direct lawmaking
power. 81 In addition, the provisions that established the Electoral College
system82 and that provided for the election of U.S. Senators by the state
legislatures 83 substantially limited the ability of citizens to choose their
elected representatives. 84 Under the original system, the citizens of the
United States could elect only the members of the House of
Representatives by means of a direct vote. 85
The underlying reasons for this rejection of direct democracy
derived from concerns regarding the threat of "factions" and the tyranny
of the majority.86 "Faction," in the words ofJames Madison, refers to
a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the

76

See Marci Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH.

ROUNDTABLE 1,4-10 (1997).
77 Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395,401-02 (2003); Frickey, supra note 71 at 42526.
78 See Eule, supra note 75 at 1513.
79 See CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(a).
80 See Frickey, supra note 70 at 423-25; see also Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at
1166.
81 Hamilton, supra note 76 at 7.
82 U.S. CONST. art. II. § 1.
83 U.S. CONST. art. I. § 3.
84 See Frickey, supra note 70 at 424.
85 See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 2.
86 See Frickey, supra note 70 at 424-425.
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f h
. 87
.
pennanent an d aggregate mterests
0 t e commUnIty.

Madison's fellow revolutionary Alexander Hamilton aptly summarized
the threat posed by factions and what should be done about it:
Men love power .... Give all power to the many, they will oppress
the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both
therefore ought to have power, that each may defend itself against the
other. 88

According to Madison, representative government accomplishes this
objective because it
refiners] and enlargers] public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern
the true interest of our country, and whose patriotism and love of
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations. 89

Citizen participation in government was originally limited to the
election of representative lawmakers and the President. 90 However, the
operation of the electoral college and the choosing of senators by the
state legislatures mediated citizens' exercise of this election power. 91 As
a result of this inherent distrust of direct citizen participation in
government, the view that the framers would look upon direct citizen
lawmaking "with a feeling akin to horror" finds substantial support in
both the text and history ofthe U.S. Constitution. 92
B.

THE HISTORY OF THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA

Even though the U.S. Constitution does not provide for direct
democracy, many states-California included-have pursued an
alternate course. Currently about half of the states allow for some form
of direct democracy.93 Beginning in 1898 with South Dakota, a wave of
state constitutional reforms precipitated by the Populist and Progressive

87

[d. at 424.

Thomas Cronin, Direct Democracy 7 (1989).
89 Frickey, supra note 70 at 425.
90 /d. at 424.
88

91

[d.

92

Eu1e, supra note 75 at 1523.
Frickey, supra note 70 at 426.

93
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Movements swept through the western half of the country.94 By the time
this wave retreated, it had deposited provisions for the exercise of direct
democracy in the constitutions of many western states, including
California. 95
The late nineteenth century was a time of rapid industrial growth
and corresponding social change. 96 In California during this time, the
Southern Pacific Railroad had come to completely dominate politics and
government. 97 In the thirty years following the adoption of the 1879
version of the state constitution, not a single bill opposed by the railroad
company was passed in the legislature.98
Eventually, a movement against the railroad's political monopoly
took shape and began to groW. 99 The core of this movement consisted of
a group of Republican lawyers and merchants who were dissatisfied with
the railroad's grip on power. 100
Through tireless effort, these
Republicans eventually elected a reform-minded governor-Hiram
Johnson-and a sympathetic legislature. 101 In 1911 Governor Hiram
Johnson called a special election as a way of delivering on his promise to
end the dominance of special interests in the state capital of
Sacramento. 102 The result was the adoption of the initiative process in
California, which has been subsequently hailed by a prominent justice of
the California Supreme Court as "one of the outstanding achievements of
the progressive movement of the early 1900s.,,103
Regarding the purpose of the adoption of the initiative and
referendum in California, Hiram Johnson, in his inaugural address,
declared:
And while I do not by any means believe the Initiative, the
Referendum, and the Recall are the panacea for all our political ills,
yet they do give the electorate the power of action when desired, and
they do place in the hands of the People the means by which they may

94 See Arne R. Leonard, In Search of the Deliberative Initiative: A Proposal for a New
Method of Constitutional Change, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1203,1207 (1996).
95
1d.

See David. B. Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution 5 (1989).
See Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1183.
98
1d.
99 See id. at II 85-86.
100 Id. at 1186.
96
97

WIld.
IW ld .
103

Id. at 1187.
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protect themselves.

104

Indeed, the ballot pamphlet that was circulated in support of the 1911
amendment creating the initiative power stated
[The initiative] is not intended and will not be a substitute for
legislation, but will constitute that safeguard which the people should
retain for themselves to supplement the work of the legislature by
initiating those measures which the legislature either viciously or
in
negligently fails or refuses to enact; and to hold the legislature
check, and to veto or negate such measures as it may viciously or
negligently enact. 105

From its inception, the initiative process in California has served as
the people's check on their elected representatives. 106 The original
understanding of the initiative's purpose envisioned it as a structural
safeguard that would ensure that the people's ability to correct abuses of
legislative power would remain intact. 107 However, it was not intended
as a wholesale substitute for the state legislature. 108
C.

THE INITIATIVE TODAY

From the time of its adoption, the California initiative has evolved
from a means by which ordinary citizens may put a stop to unsavory or
self-serving practices of the state legislature into another tool for wellfunded special interests to advance their agenda. 109 In particular, the
advent of the "initiative industry" has placed the initiative at the disposal
of the very special interest groups whose influence it was meant to
curb. 11O Moreover, the initiative process has increasingly supplanted the
state legislature in both enacting legislation and defining public policy. III
For its part, the state's political apparatus has adapted itself to an
environment where the initiative reigns supreme. I 12 Politicians have
104 Donald S. Greenberg, Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 CAL. L.
1717, 1741 (1966).
105 Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1188.
106 Id. at 1169.
107 /d. at 1188.
108
1d.
109 See id. at 1190.
110 See David Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13,35-36 (1995); see also Schrag, supra note 16 at 94041.
III See Frickey, supra note 70 at 429-30.
112 See Uelmen, supra note 16 at 999.

REV.
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begun to take on sponsorship roles for particular initiatives in the hopes
that popular support for the ballot measure they sponsor will foster equal
support for their campaign for elective office. 113 At the same time,
legislators have displayed a tendency to avoid difficult questions of
public policy, preferring to let such disputes resolve themselves on the
initiative battleground. 114
Advocates of the initiative process justify the lack of procedural
safeguards by simple appeal to the democratic ideal; they argue that
citizens enacting laws on their own, without help from the legislature, is
the essence of democracy. 115 Further, because legislatures are inherently
susceptible to corruption and undue influence by special interests, the
initiative process allows ordinary citizens to resolve pressing public
issues with which the legislature has been unable or unwilling to deal. 116
Critics of the initiative process argue that as a form of direct
democracy it is inconsistent with the basic republican form of
government enshrined in the Constitution of the United States and
therefore is prohibited by the Guarantee Clause in Article IV. 117 Such
critics also point out that the lack of an opportunity for deliberation and
compromise in the initiative process poses a unique threat to the rights of
politically unpopular minorities such as illegal immigrants, criminal
defendants, and gays and lesbians. I 18
Regardless of the merits of these arguments for and against, the
initiative process in California has become a permanent part of the state's
legal and political landscape. 119 Voters regard it as a way to include
themselves in a legislative process that often seems unduly long and
difficult. 120 As noted above, politicians find it useful as a tool for selfmarketing. 121 Well-financed special interests use it as an alternative
means of advancing their agendas when the legislature is slow to act on

See Magleby, supra note 110 at 29.
See id.; see also Uelmen, supra note 16 at 1000.
115 See Schmidt, supra note 96 at vii-viii.
116 See id. at 26.
117 The Guarantee Clause, contained in art. IV § 4 of the U.S. Constitution, provides in
pertinent part, ''The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a Republican fonn of
government."
118 See Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative Reform,
41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037, 1051 (2001); see also Craig B. Holman and Robert Stern, Judicial
Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
1239,1246 (1998).
119 See Kuehl, supra note 28 at 1329.
120 See id.
113
114

121

See Magleby, supra note 110 at 29.
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or is unresponsive to their needs. 122 Finally, grassroots citizen groups see
it as the only available means to advocate for their issues when the
legislature has both ears bent by the aforementioned special interests. '23
The initiative process means many things to many people. 124 Its
paramount role in California can hardly be disputed, yet its place within
the state's constitutional structure has not been fully explored. Before
attempting to place the initiative power alongside the other powers duly
vested by the constitution in the other coordinate branches of
government, that power and its existing limits must be defined.
III. THE lNITIA TIVE POWER
The ability of the citizens of California to propose and adopt their
own statutes and constitutional amendments via the initiative process
derives from a combination of two provisions in the state constitution. '25
Article IV, section 1, vests the legislative power of the state "in the
California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly," but
goes on to provide that "the people reserve to themselves the powers of
initiative and referendum.,,'26 Article II, section 8(a), defines this
"reserved" power of initiative as "the power of the electors to propose
statutes and amendments to the constitution and to adopt or reject
them."I27
Construing the language of article IV, section 1, California courts
have treated the people's statutory initiative power as co-extensive with
that of the legislature. 128 In other words, it is a form of legislative
power. 129 Even though the initiative process and the conventional
legislative process are two forms of the same constitutional power, the
two differ significantly in terms of the place occupied by each in the
state's constitutional jurisprudence. 130
A.

JUDICIAL REVIEW As THE SOLE CHECK ON THE INITIATIVE POWER

Once a bill passes both houses of the legislature, it must be
Frickey, supra note 70 at 432.
See Schmidt, supra note 96 at 30.
124 See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
125 See CAL. CONST. art. N. § 1; see also Cal. Const. art. II § 8(a).
126 CAL. CONST. art. N. § 1.
127 CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(a).
122

123

128

See, e.g. Santa Clara County Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino, 902 P.2d 225, 246 (Cal.

129

See id.

130

See Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1202.

1995).
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presented to the governor for signature or veto. 131 This requirement
constitutes an important check on the legislative power as it is exercised
by the state's body of elected representatives. 132 Indeed, presentment is a
function of the fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of
powers which serves to guard against an accumulation of governmental
power in the hands of a single entity.133 In contrast, laws passed by
initiative take effect automatically upon approval by the voters. 134 No
presentment to the governor or the legislature is needed for a proposed
initiative to become law once it has survived a popular vote. 135
Moreover, a law enacted through the initiative process cannot be
amended or repealed except through another popular vote. 136 If the
legislature wishes to amend or repeal an initiated law, it must pass a
statute that the voters must in tum approve. 137 The only exception occurs
when the law itself allows for legislative amendment or repeal without
the need for a popular vote. 138
The inability on the part of the state legislature to amend or repeal
initiated laws has led the California Supreme Court to conclude that in
this connection the people's initiative power is superior to the state
legislature's lawmaking power. 139 Specifically, this superiority consists
in the fact that whereas the legislature may not pass laws that bind future
legislatures, laws passed through initiative may and do bind future
legislatures because such legislatures are unable to amend or repeal those
laws. 140
The result of these differences is that judicial review is the only
check on the legislative power as it is exercised by the people through
the initiative process. 141 As noted above, the executive branch possesses
no check on the initiative power because the state constitution does not
require initiated laws to be presented to the governor for signature or
veto. 142 Likewise, the state legislature possesses no check on the
initiative power because it is powerless to amend or repeal initiated
CAL. CONST. art. IV. § JO(a).
See Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. State, 20 P.3d 533, 539 (Cal. 2001).
133 See id.
131

132

135

See CAL. CONST. art. II. § JO(a}.
See id.

136

See CAL. CONST. art. II. § JO(e).

134

Id.
138
Id.
139 See Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 574 (Cal. 1995).
140
Id.
141 See Richard B. Collins, How Democratic Are Initiatives? 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 983, 999
(2001).
142 See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
137
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laws,143 nor does it play any substantive role in the formulation and
proposal of those laws. l44 Review by the judiciary stands alone as a
method for keeping the people's exercise of the initiative power within
the bounds prescribed for it by the state constitution. 145
B.

THE ISSUE OF DEFERENCE

That judicial review is the sole check on the initiative power, given
the absence of a presentment requirement or a legislative amendment or
repeal power, might lead one to think that California courts closely
scrutinize initiated laws when assessing their constitutionality, but often
the opposite seems to be true. 146 All exercises of legislative power are
entitled to a degree of judicial deference as a matter of comity between
co-equal branches of government,147 but initiated laws appear to enjoy an
even greater degree of deference than do laws passed by the state
legislature. 148 In particular, while the courts strictly construe the
constitutional limits on what the legislature may dO,149 they liberally
construe the permissible uses of the initiative power. 150
California courts have developed a tradition of employing highly
deferential language in cases that involve legal challenges to initiatives.
The following is a typical example: "it is our solemn duty 'to jealously
guard' the initiative power, it being 'one of the most precious rights of
our democratic process. ",lSI Another common passage is as follows:
Although the legislative power under our state Constitution is vested
in the Legislature, "the people reserve to themselves the powers of
initiative and referendum." [Citation.] Accordingly, the initiative
power must be liberally construed to promote the democratic
152
process.

Commentators have offered several explanations for this apparent

See CAL. CONST. an. IV. § I.
See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9003 (West 2005).
145 See Collins, supra note 140 at 999.
146 See Craig B. Holman and Robert Stern, supra note 118 at 1250.
147 See Hunt v. Superior Court, 987 P.2d. 708, 722 (Cal. 1999).
148 See Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1217.
149 Collins v. Riley, 152 P.2d 169, 171 (Cal. 1944).
150 See Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 277 (Cal. 1982).
151 Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281,
1302 (Cal. 1978).
152 California Ass'n of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224, 236 (Ct. App.
2003) (emphasis in original).
143

144
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deference. 153 Perhaps the most convincing was put forth by Joseph
Grodin, a former justice of the California Supreme Court, who compared
deciding initiative cases to handling "hot potatoes" in that
It is one thing for a court to tell a legislature that a statute it has
adopted is unconstitutional; to tell that to the people of a state who
have indicated their direct support for the measure through the ballot
.
h 154
IS anot er.

In other words, a main reason for judicial deference to initiatives is that
justices of the California Supreme Court are subject to periodic retention
elections. 155 As a result, justices that vote to invalidate laws passed by
initiative face the possibility of electoral reprisal for their actions. 156 Otto
Kaus, another former justice of the California Supreme Court once
famously remarked on the dilemma facing a justice who must decide
controversial cases while facing a popular election: "It is difficult to
ignore a crocodile in your bathtub when you are shaving in the
morning." 157
This "crocodile in the bathtub" effect provides a convincing
explanation for the courts' use of the aforementioned highly deferential
language. The deference to initiated laws serves to insulate the state's
judiciary from the threat of electoral reprisal. As such, the California
judiciary's deference to initiatives must be interpreted as more rhetorical
than substantive, for as the next section demonstrates, initiatives in fact
possess no greater constitutional weight than conventional legislation.
IV. LIMITS ON THE INITIATIVE POWER

Notwithstanding the apparent deference accorded to initiated laws
by California courts, by and large those courts have declined to elevate
such laws to a privileged constitutional status. 158 Instead, they have
enforced the constitutional limitations on the initiative power in as
straightforward a manner as they enforce the limits on what the state
legislature may dO. 159
The single-subject requirement and the
requirement of overall constitutionality each derive from an even-handed
See, e.g. Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1198.
Uelmen, supra note 16 at 1000-01.
155 See CAL. CONST. art. VI. § 16.
156 See Uelmen, supra note 16 at 1000-01.
157 W.P. Rylaarsdam, Judicia/Independence: A Value Worth Protecting, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1653, 1655-56 (1993).
158 Uelmen, supra note 16 at 1000.
159 See, e.g., Wallace v. Zinman, 254 P. 946, 949 (Cal. 1927).
153

154
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application of constitutional principles that apply to all exercises of
legislative power, whether initiated or not. 160
A.

THE SINGLE-SUBJECT REQUIREMENT

The California Constitution provides that "[a]n initiative measure
embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or
have any effect.,,161 The legislature and the voters added this provision
to the state constitution in 1948. 162 The impetus for this constitutional
amendment came from the legal establishment's reaction to the so-called
"ham and eggs" movement spearheaded by two brothers, Lawrence and
Willis Allen. 163
The Allen brothers were the proponents of what they named the
"California Bill of Rights," an initiative constitutional amendment that
would have added 21,000 words to a constitution that was then
composed of around 55,000. 164 The amendment addressed a dizzying
array of topics: pensions, taxes, voting rights for Indians, gambling,
oleomargarine, health professionals, reapportionment, surface mining,
and fishing rights. 165
While the petition for this amendment was circulating, the state
legislature voted to place its own constitutional amendment on the
ballot-the amendment containing the single-subject rule. 166 In fact,
arguments used during the campaign for adopting the single-subject rule
pointed specifically to the Allen brothers' "bill of rights" as a prime
example of why a single-subject rule should be in place. 167 The voters
adopted the single-subject rule in the election of 1948. 168 The so-called
"California Bill of Rights" however, was not so lucky; the California
Supreme Court's decision in McFadden v. Jordan removed the initiative
from the ballot before the people ever had a chance to vote on it. 169
The California Supreme Court first applied the newly minted singlesubject rule in Perry v. Jordan.170 The Perry court observed that while
cf Manheim and Howard. supra note 17 at 1202.
CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(d).
162 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 936, 936 (1983).
163 See id. at 949.
164 Stanley Mosk, Raven and Revision, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1,6 (1991).
165 Lowenstein, supra note 162 at 950.
166 Id.
160
161

Id. at 950-51.
Id. at 936.
169 McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787,800 (Cal. 1948).
170 Perry v. Jordan, 207 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1949).
167

168
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the legislature had enacted the constitutional prohibition on initiatives
"embracing more than one subject" the year before, such a restriction on
laws enacted by the legislature had been present in the constitution for a
long time. 17I
At the time, article IV, section 24, read: "Every
[legislative] act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be
expressed in its title.,,172 As to this single-subject rule for standard
legislative acts, the California Supreme Court had announced a test in
Evans v. Superior Court: the rule "is to be construed liberally to uphold
proper legislation, all parts of which are reasonably germane.,,173
The Perry court thus applied exactly the same standard to initiated
laws that it had to legislatively enacted laws regarding the single-subject
requirement. 174 As with acts of the legislature, the single-subject rule is
satisfied so long as the various parts of an initiated law or constitutional
amendment reasonably relate to each other so as to achieve the general
object pursued. 175 Since that time, the California Supreme Court has
applied the "reasonably germane" test whenever a statewide initiative
has been challenged under the single-subject requirement. 176
B.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY REQUIREMENT

In addition to the single-subject requirement, the California courts
have construed the existence of another limit on the statutory initiative
power: initiated laws must comply with the same federal and state
constitutional standards as legislatively-enacted laws. 177 This means that
California courts will strike down an initiative that violates an existing
provision of either the state or the U.S. Constitution. 178
Legislature v. Deukmejian is the leading case demonstrating this
principle. In Deukmejian the California Supreme Court held invalid an
initiative redistricting measure as conflicting with an express
constitutional provision that sets the rules for redrawing legislative
districts. 179 Article XXI of the California Constitution requires that the

171

Id. at 92.

Id.; the same provision is now contained in art. IV § 9.
Evans v. Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467,469 (Cal. 1932).
174 See Perry, 207 P.2d at 50.

172
173
175

Id.

176 See, e.g. Amador Valley, 583 P.2d at 1289-92; Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 279-84; Fair
Political Practices Commission v. Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46, 55 (Cal. 1979); Raven v.
Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1083-85 (Cal. 1990); Senate v. Jones, 988 P.2d 1089, 1098-1105 (Cal.
1999).
177 Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17,27 (Cal. 1983).
178 See id.
179/d. at 30.
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legislature reset the boundaries of the state's legislative districts at some
point during the year following the federal census. 180 In 1983, Governor
George Oeukmejian called for a special election so the people of the state
could vote on a redistricting initiative that, if passed, would have
redrawn the districts and repealed the redistricting statutes that the
legislature had enacted two years before. 181
The California Supreme Court saw this as an attempt to effect a
second redistricting by initiative after the constitutionally mandated
redistricting had already occurred. 182 The problem with this attempt was
that it ran afoul of the long-standing "once-a-decade" interpretation of
article XXI. 183 The court found that the authors of the state constitution
intended that redistricting occur immediately following each decennial
federal census and not occur again until after the next census. 184 In 1981,
the legislature had performed its duty under article XXI to redraw the
boundaries of the various legislative districts in the state. 185 As a result,
the court held that any attempt to change the districts before the 1990
federal census had taken place was impermissible under article XXI. 186
The initiative proponents, in attempting to evade the requirements
of the "once-a-decade" rule, put forth what the court saw as a "novel
theory.,,187 They argued that article XXI only operates as a limitation on
the legislature and not on the initiative power.188 The court found itself
puzzled by the idea that initiatives should be exempted from the same
constitutional limitations that apply to legislatively-enacted laws. 189 The
initiative power to propose and enact statutes is a form of legislative
power "which otherwise would reside in the Legislature.,,190 Thus, "it
has heretofore been considered to be no greater with respect to the nature
and attributes of the statutes that may be enacted than that of the
Legislature.,,191
The California Supreme Court in Wallace v. Zinman directly
addressed the issue of whether initiated statutes should be accorded

XXI.
See Legislature v. Deukmejian. 669 P.2d at 19.

180 CAL. CONST. art.
181
182

[d. at 29.

183

See id. at 22-26.

184/d.

at 23.

185

[d. at 21.

186

[d. at 29.
at 25.

187/d.
188

[d.

189

[d. at 26.

190 /d.
191

[d.
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greater deference than laws enacted by the legislature. 192 The court
unequivocally stated that initiative statutes are not entitled to greater
constitutional status than ordinary laws:
We do not recognize an initiative measure as having any greater
strength or dignity than attaches to any other legislation .... It is only
another system added to our plan of state government by a permissive
amendment to the constitution, but it was at no time intended that such
permissive legislation by direct vote should override the other
safeguards of the constitution .... We have a state government with
three departments, each to check upon the others, and it would be
subversive of the very foundation purposes of our government to
permit an initiative act of any type to throw out of gear our entire le?al
mechanism. Our common sense makes us rebel at the suggestion. 19

The California Court of Appeal followed the Deukmejian court's
lead when deciding People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court. At issue
in People's Advocate was an initiative known as the Legislative Reform
Act of 1983. 194 This initiative sought to make radical changes to the
organization and procedures of the state Senate and Assembly and to
substantially curtail the future apportioning of funds designated for their
operation. 195 Because article IV, section 7, of the state constitution
authorizes each house of the legislature to fashion rules for its
proceedings, an initiative measure that purports to do the same effects an
unconstitutional usurpation of a power explicitly bestowed upon the
legislature. 196
In keeping with the principle announced in Zinman that initiatives
do not possess any privileged constitutional status, the court in People's
Advocate accorded the initiative at issue no greater constitutional weight
than any other statute. 197 Again, the standards applied to initiatives are
no different from the standards applied to acts of the state legislature. 198
Neither initiated statute nor legislative act may exceed the bounds set for
them by the state constitution. 199
This Comment attempts to follow the path charted in Zinman. Just
as acts of the state legislature must comply with all applicable
192
193
194

195

Zinman, 254 P. at 946.
/d. at 949.
People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 640, 642 eCt. App. 1986).
[d.

See id. at 645.
See id.
198 See id.
199 See id. at 647.
196
197
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constitutional provisions, so should the people's exercise of the initiative
power be made to comply with the state constitution. 2oo This should
include the separation of powers requirement contained in article ill,
section 3. No legitimate reason exists to exempt the initiative power
from this important requirement, particularly in light of Zinman's
holding that statutory initiatives are entitled to no greater constitutional
weight merely as a result of being proposed and passed by the voters
instead of the state legislature. 201
V.

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

IN CALIFORNIA

Article ill, section 3, of the California Constitution provides that
"the powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial.
Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either
of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.,,202
This provision was included in the original version of the California
Constitution, written in 1849,z03 When drafting the first California
Constitution, the delegates followed the practice of other recently
constituted states by lifting verbatim the language of existing state
constitutions and inserting that language into their own,z04
The Virginia Constitution was the first state charter created after the
Continental Congress requested that the colonial governments write their
own foundational documents. 205 The Virginia Constitution naturally
became the model used by other states when it came time to fashion their
own constitutions,z°6 Thus, because Virginia had included a separation
of powers provision in its constitution, many other states did as well. 207
California was no exception. 208 The delegates to the state constitutional
convention in 1849 relied heavily on the recently-passed constitutions of
other states, notably Iowa. 209 Iowa had, in tum, relied upon the Kentucky
Constitution, which had relied upon the charters of the thirteen original
states. 210
The pedigree of article ill, section 3, of the California Constitution
See id.
See Zinman, 254 P. at 949.
202 CAL. CONST. art. III. § 3.
203 Zasloff, supra note 18 at 1102.
204 [d. at 1103.
205 [d.
206 [d.
200
201

207

[d.

208

[d.

209

[d.

210

[d.
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can thus be traced back in an unbroken line to the founding generation. 2l1
According to the thinking of the founding generation, a government of
separate yet interacting powers is the best way to provide simultaneously
for the public welfare and for the liberty of each citizen. 212 By diffusing
power into distinct branches of government, the American constitutional
republic could by design prevent abuses of governmental power. 2\3
In keeping with the spirit of its pedigree, California courts have
construed the separation of powers provision of the California
Constitution as intended to prevent the concentration of governmental
power in the hands of a single individual or groUp.214 According to the
interpretation given it by the California courts, this provision establishes
a system of checks and balances among the various governmental powers
to ensure that one branch of government does not encroach unduly upon
the province of another. 215
A.

THE INAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL SEPARATION OF POWERS
DOCTRINE

Although the broad policy goal underlying the separation of powers
is identical at both the state and the federal level, the means through
which reviewing courts implement it in their respective jurisdictions are
very different. 216 In other words, state courts are free to develop alternate
theories and interpretations of the separation of powers without being
bound by federal separation of powers doctrine?17 Federal separation of
powers jurisprudence can serve as persuasive and instructive authority,
but state courts are not required to apply federal precedents when
interpreting the separation of powers provisions found in state
constitutions. 218 The primary reason for this lies in the fact that the U.S.
Constitution defines the powers of the various branches of the federal
government very differently from the way that state constitutions define
the powers of their respective branches of government. 219
For example, the U.S. Constitution expressly vests in the executive
211

[d.

Cronin, supra note 88 at 29.
See Eule, supra note 75 at 1528.
214 California Ass 'n of Retail Tobacconists, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254.
215 Santa Theresa Citizen Action Group v. California Energy Comm'n, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392,
398 (Cl. App. 2003).
216 See Marine Forests Soc'y v. California Coastal Comm'n, 113 P.3d 1062, 1075-77 (Cal.
2005).
217 [d. at 1076.
218 See id.
219 See id.
212
213
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branch the power to appoint
Ambassadors other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law?20

In California, however, the legislature has always had power to
appoint and remove certain officials. 221 Whereas on the federal level the
appointment of the officials listed in Article II, Section 2, is an
exclusively executive power, in California the appointment power is
shared by the executive branch and the state legislature. 222
Another reason that federal separation of powers jurisprudence is
inapplicable to California is that whereas Congress under Article I of the
U.S. Constitution may only exercise the powers that are therein
enumerated,223 state legislatures have plenary lawmaking authority.224
Article I of the U.S. Constitution is a grant of power to Congress. 225 As a
result, each congressional act must be anchored in one of Congress's
enumerated powers.226 State constitutions, by contrast, are not grants of
power but rather affirmative limits on a police power that is presumed to
be plenary.227 Thus, each act of a state legislature is valid if not
specifically prohibited by the state constitution. 228
The fact that only state legislatures have plenary lawmaking
authority, combined with the difference in the powers granted to each
branch under the U.S. Constitution on the one hand and the California
Constitution on the other, calls for a different doctrinal approach from
that used in the federal context when analyzing issues arising under
article III, section 3, of the California Constitution. 229
B.

THE CORE FuNCTION DOCTRINE

California courts have interpreted article III, section 3, as defining a
core zone of constitutionally delegated power for each branch of
220 U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2.

See Marine Forests, 113 P.3d at 1084.
1d.
223 See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8.
224 Marine Forests, 113 P.3d at 1078.
225 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 230 (2002).
226 d.
1
227
1d.
228
1d.
221

222

229

See Marine Forests, 113 P.3d at 1076.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4

208

GOLDEN GATE UNNERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

government that may not be encroached upon or infringed by any other
branch in such a way as to defeat or materially impair the exercise of that
core power?30 As a corollary to this basic principle, each branch may act
in ways that significantly affect the activities of the others so long as the
prohibited defeat or material impairment does not OCCUr. 231 In other
words, the separation of powers does not require a hermetic sealing-off
of each branch from the others; instead, it establishes an interdependent
system of checks and balances containing distinct yet porous boundaries
between the zones of power delegated to each branch of state
government. 232
1.

Each Branch May Affect the Others

A number of decisions illustrate the flexibility that the core function
doctrine incorporates into California's tripartite system of government.
For example, in Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, the California
Supreme Court held that the legislature does not violate the separation of
powers whenever it enacts regulations concerning an area over which the
courts have "inherent power.,,233
The controversy in County of Mendocino arose when the legislature,
in an attempt to help local governments meet their budgetary obligations,
enacted an urgency statute that gave counties the power to designate
unpaid "furlough days" on which the local court "shall not be in
session.,,234 The superior court, ignoring the county's designation,
ordered its employees to report for work on two of the designated
furlough days.235 When the county refused to pay the employees for
those days at work, the superior court filed suit alleging that the county
lacked the constitutional authority to designate days when the court will
not be in session?36
The California Supreme Court upheld the authority of the county to
designate unpaid furlough days on which the court will not be in
session.237 The county had received this authority from the urgency

230 Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 16 (Cal. 2002); Carmel Valley, 20 P.3d at 538;
Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d 1046, 1054 (Cal. 1996).
231 Manduley, 41 P.3d at 16; Carmel Valley, 20 P.3d at 538; County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d
at 1051.
232 In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49,55 (Cal. 1998).
233 County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d at 1054.
234 [d. at 1048.
235 Id. at 1049.

236

[d.

237

[d. at 1059.
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statute passed by the legislature. 238
constitutional authority to

The legislature, in turn, has the

adopt reasonable regulations affecting a court's inherent powers or
functions, so long as the legislation does not "defeat" or "materially
impair" a court's exercise of its constitutional power or the fulfillment
239
of its constitutional function.

In light of the long-standing practice by the legislature of designating
court holidays--days on which the court is not in session-the supreme
court found no reason to conclude that the county's action defeated or
materially impaired the superior court's exercise of the judicial power. 240
2.

The Powers Are Not Always Distinct

Under the core function doctrine, executive and judicial officers
may "exercise quasi-legislative authority in establishing general policies
and promulgating general rules for the governing of affairs within their
respective spheres" without offending the separation of powers. 241 Thus,
in In re Attorney Discipline System, the California Supreme Court held
that it's assessment of an additional fee on members of the state bar to
fund the state's attorney- discipline system did not impermissibly usurp
the legislative power of appropriation.242 Because the judicial power
includes inherent authority over the area of attorney discipline,
assessment of the fee was within the court's power even though it did, in
some sense, replicate a legislative function. 243
Similarly, the court in Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal
Commission held that provisions of the Coastal Act vesting the power to
appoint members of the Coastal Commission in the Senate Rules
Committee and the Speaker of the Assembly did not violate the
separation of powers because under the state's constitution, the
appointment power is not the sole province of the executive?44
Therefore, exercise by another branch of the appointment power does not
invade any "core zone" of executive function if such exercise leaves
intact the governor's exercise of the appointment power. 245
Id . at 1048.
Id . at 1055.
240 See id. at 1059.
238
239

241
242

In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 57.
Id. at 52.

243/d.
244

Marine Forests, 133 P.3d at 1062.
at 1088.

245 /d.
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The proscribed defeat or material impairment of the governor's
appointment power did not result from the Coastal Act's vesting of
appointment power in members of the legislature for a number of
reasons. 246 First, the Coastal Commission is an autonomous regulatory
agency.247 It is not a close and indispensable arm of the executive such
that legislative appointment of its members would trample upon "an
exclusively executive prerogative.,,248
Second, as an autonomous regulatory agency the Commission
routinely exercises "a broad variety of functions, including both quasilegislative and quasi-judicial functions as well as more traditional
executive functions.,,249 The fact that the Commission does more than
merely "execute" the laws casts doubt upon the claim that the executive
branch should have the sole authority to appoint its members. 25o
Finally, the Coastal Act itself provides sufficient procedural
safeguards to ensure that the Commission operates without undue
interference by the legislature. 251 The presence of such procedural
safeguards greatly reduces the possibility that the legislature will defeat
or materially impair the Coastal Commission's functions through
intrusive oversight or contro1. 252
Marine Forests illustrates that the core function doctrine is a rather
liberal standard. The doctrine allows for a substantial degree of
"mixing" governmental powers. It recognizes that one branch may
imitate the functions of another so long as the "core zone" of each is not
completely subsumed. 253
3.

What May Not Be Done

Implicit in this formulation of the core function doctrine is the idea
that one branch may unconstitutionally reach too far into the realm of
another. 254 Thus, California courts
have not hesitated to strike down provisions of law that either accrete
to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate
Branches or that undermine the authority and independence of one or
246
247
248
249

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

See id.
[d. at 109l.
252 See id.
253 Carmel Valley, 20 P.3d at 539.
254 See id.
250
251
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another coordinate Branch. 255
In People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) the California Supreme
Court ruled that a state law granting prosecutors a veto over a trial
court's order that a criminal defendant participate in a pretrial diversion
program was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of
powers. 256 The court found that the diversion order was a form of
sentencing, and as such it was an exercise of judicial power entitled to
protection under article III, section 3.257
By contrast, the California Supreme Court in Sledge v. Superior
Court held that the determination of whether a criminal defendant was
eligible for pre-trial diversion is not an exercise of judicial power. 258
Therefore a prosecutor could constitutionally refuse to initiate diversion
proceedings since that decision invaded no protected area of judicial
authority.259
In the context of criminal proceedings,
the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the legislative branch from
granting prosecutors the authority, after charges have been filed, to
control the legislatively specified sentencing choices available to a
court. 260
On the other hand, statutes granting discretion to prosecutors to make
decisions before filing charges do not violate the separation of powers
merely because such decisions inevitably affect "the dispositional
options available to the court.,,261
The California Supreme Court has also held that under the
separation of powers a court may not directly order the legislature to
enact an appropriation law. 262 It may, however, require that funds
already appropriated be paid out to satisfy a valid judgment against a
state agency.263
The court in County of Mendocino gave a good general overview of
the limits on the exercise of each power:

255

ld. at 538.

256

People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), 520 P.2d 405, 406 (Cal. 1974).
See id. at 412.

257
258

259

Sledge v. Superior Court, 520 P.2d 412, 414 (Cal. 1974).
See id.

260

Manduley, 41 P.3d at \3 (emphasis in original).

261

1d.

262

Mandel v. Myers, 629 P.2d 935, 941 (Cal. 1981).
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this doctrine [i.e. the separation of powers] unquestionably places
limits upon the actions of each branch with respect to the other
branches. The judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by. the
Legislature, may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the policies
embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the
choice among competing policy considerations in enacting laws is a
legislative function. The executive branch, in expending public funds,
may not disregard legislatively prescribed directives and limits
pertaining to the use of such funds. And the Legislature may not
undertake to readjudicate controversies that have been litigated in the
courts and resolved by final judicial judgment. 264

The doctrine of the separation of powers in California operates to
prevent the undue accumulation of power in the hands of a single branch
by maintaining distinct yet porous boundaries between the executive, the
legislature, and the judiciary.265 When one branch defeats or materially
impairs the ability of another branch to perform its constitutionally
vested function, the former branch has violated the separation of
powers.266 The powers of each branch may to an extent be mixed, but
one branch may not completely subsume the powers of another?67
VI. THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE CHECK ON THE STATUTORY
lNITIA TIVE POWER

When the core function doctrine is applied to the initiative power,
the provisions of the state constitution defining the initiative powe?68
appear to conflict with the doctrine of the separation of powers as it is
expressed in Article III Section 3. 269 The lack of a legislative check on
exercises of the initiative power amounts to a complete arrogation of the
legislative power. This conflict is created by an ambiguity in the
constitutional language that defines the initiative power. 270 Applying
traditional methods of constitutional construction to this ambiguity yields
the conclusion that some form of legislative check on the initiative power
must exist if the separation of powers is to be respected and maintained.
The intent underlying the creation of the initiative power was not to
completely displace the state legislature as a lawmaking body but rather
County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d at 1051 (citations omitted).
In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 55.
266 County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d at 1054.
267 See Marine Forests, 113 P.3d at 1074.
268 See CAL. CaNST. art. IV. § I; see also CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(a).
269 Cf Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1202-03.
270 See CAL. CONST. art. IV. § I; see also CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(a).
264
265
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to merely provide a check on its exercise of the legislative power.271 The
lack of any meaningful involvement by the legislature in the initiative
process renders it wholly inferior as a lawmaking bod/72 in derogation
of separation of powers principles.
The core function doctrine requires the existence of a central zone
of legislative power that may be exercised only by the state legislature. 273
The doctrine precludes using the initiative power to defeat or materially
impair the legislature's exercise of its core powers.274 The doctrine
likewise requires that the initiative power remain free from defeating or
materially impairing interference by the state legislature. 275
The constitutional legislative power is generally defined as the
ability to pass laws, levy taxes, make appropriations, and determine the
legislative policy of the state. 276 The state legislature may do each of
these things with an expectation that the executive and the judiciary will
not unduly impede its efforts in these areas?77 The voters of the state,
through the initiative power, may also pass laws, levy taxes, and make
appropriations with a comparable expectation that their decisions will not
be thwarted by the efforts of the other three branches of government.
However, while the people of the state possess a check on their
legislators in the form of the initiative process, the door does not swing
both ways. The state legislature is powerless in the face of the people's
exercise of the "reserved" initiative power. The legislature has no say in
what laws are proposed and which ones are passed by initiative. 278 In
addition, initiated laws are generally beyond the legislature's ability to
amend or repeal. 279 The result is that the legislature's exercise of
legislative power is inferior to the voters' exercise of that same power. 280
The legislature has no peculiar lawmaking province of its own-it makes
laws that exist at the pleasure of those who exercise the initiative
power?81 Such a complete arrogation of the legislature's ability to pass
laws is repugnant to the principle of the separation of powers.
The conflict between the separation of powers provision and those

271

272
273

274
275

See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
See Rossi, 889 P,2d at 574.
See Marine Forests. 113 PJd at 1074.
See id.
See id.

Carmel Valley, 20 P.3d at 539.
See County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d at lOS!.
278 See supra notes 48-74 and accompanying text.
279 See CAL CONST. art. II. § 10(c).
280 See Rossi, 889 P.2d at 574.
281 See id.
276
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provisions relating to the initiative power derives from an ambiguity in
the relevant language. Article IV, section 1, vests the legislative power
of the state in the Senate and Assembly, but it also provides that the
people "reserve" to themselves the initiative power. 282 Article II, section
8(a), defines the initiative power as the ability to propose and pass
statutory laws and constitutional amendments?83
The ambiguity lies in the fact that the limits of this "reservation" are
not specified. 284 Is the reservation complete or merely partial? Do the
people reserve to themselves only a portion of the state's legislative
power, or is the reservation wholesale?
Even though the constitutional language provides no guidance on
this question, the decision in People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court,
discussed above, militates against an interpretation of article IV, section
1, that the people "reserve" to themselves the whole of the state's
legislative power. 285 The court stated,
the petitioners [in the case at bar] seek to trade upon an assumption
about the extent of the legislative power of the people. They assume
that the initiative power includes the whole of the legislative power ..
. . The assumption is incorrect .... Such reserved powers [of initiative
and referendum] are exclusively specified in article II, section 8, and
286
are limited to that which has been specifically delegated.

This passage suggests that a portion of the state's legislative power exists
that may not be exercised by initiative; if that is the case, then the
"unreserved" portion of legislative power should be entitled to protection
under the separation of powers provision of the state constitution.
Where ambiguity exists, recourse must be had to settled standards
of judicial construction in order to resolve it. 287 The cardinal goal of
judicial construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
lawmaking body.288 In addition, constitutional provisions should if
possible be construed so that conflict or repugnancy is avoided?89
As noted above, the intent behind the creation of the initiative
power was only to provide the people of California a check on the

282

CAL. CONST. art. IV. § 1

CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(a).
See CAL. CONST. art. IV. § I.
285 See supra notes 194-199 and accompanying text.
286 People's Advocate, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
287 See Brown v. San Francisco, 266 P.2d 951, 953 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
288 Richmond v. Shasta Cmty. Servs. Dist., 83 P.3d 518, 522 (Cal. 2004).
289 People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 268 P.2d 723, 732 (Cal. 1954).
283
284
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activities of the state legislature. 29o The creators of the initiative did not
intend to thereby replace the Senate and Assembly as the chief organ for
the exercise of legislative power?91 As such, an interpretation of article
IV, section 1, and its language of "reservation" that assumes a complete
rather than partial reservation would contravene the intent of the
lawmakers who adopted the initiative process in 1911.292 Interpreting the
"reservation" as only partial would not only avoid repugnancy with the
separation of powers provision but would also have the salutary effect of
implementing the original intent of the creators of the initiative
process?93
VII. CONCLUSION

The purpose behind the creation of the initiative power was to
provide the people of the state with an effective check on the actions of
their elected representatives?94 It was not to create a second and more
powerful avenue for the exercise of the state's legislative power.295 The
initiative power gives the people a useful check on the legislature, but
under the current constitution the legislature possesses no check on the
initiative power. 296 The result is that the initiative power exercises a
lawmaking function that is superior to that of the legislature?97 Such
superiority is repugnant to the doctrine of the separation of powers as it
is expressed in article III, section 3, of the state constitution. Even
though the constitution vests the state's legislative power in two different
entities-the legislature and the initiative process-the separation of
powers requires that each entity be allowed to perform its core function
without completely arrogating the constitutionally delegated powers of
the other. 298
At the heart of this repugnancy lies the aforementioned wholesale
exclusion of the state legislature from the initiative process.299 By
placing initiated laws beyond the power of the legislature to amend or
repeal, the state constitution violates one of its own precepts-the

See supra notes 104- \08 and accompanying text.
See id.
292 See id.
293 See id.
290

291

See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
See id.
296 See CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8.
297 See Rossi, 889 P.2d at 574.
298 See Marine Forests, 113 P.3d at 1087.
299 Cj Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1202-03.
294
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separation of powers. 3OO This lack of a repeal or amendment power
renders the state legislature a subordinate rather than coordinate branch
of government vis-a-vis the initiative power. 301 This article III, section 3,
does not allow. All branches of government must operate on a level
playing field if the principle of the separation of powers is to be
respected and maintained. 302
In 1996 the California Constitution Revision Commission
recommended to the state legislature that the initiative process be
reformed so as to meaningfully include the legislature in the process:
The initiative process should not exclude the legislature from the
lawmaking process. The legislature is a lawmaking body, and it has
experience in making laws and considering their outcomes. The
legislature should-at a minimum-have a role in the initiative
process to ensure that initiatives are well-written and meet the
purposes for which they are designed. Additionally, once an initiative
statute is enacted, there should be a mechanism for evaluating its
impact. If an initiative statute is not meeting its intended purpose, or
if it is having unexpected consequences, the legislature and the
governor should be able to revise the law. 303

Such reforms would bring the California initiative process into
alignment not only with separation of powers principles but also with its
sister initiative states. California is one of the only initiative states that
does not allow for legislative amendment or repeal of initiated laws. 304
The special election of 2005 demonstrated the propensity of
California's political establishment to rely on the initiative process as an
engine for political gain. The root of this propensity lies not in the fount
of political ambition, but rather in the constitutional provisions that give
the people, through the initiative process, a superior lawmaking power. 305
The center of politics will naturally gravitate toward the greatest source
of political power; the initiative, as the most powerful form of
lawmaking in the state, clearly has taken on this role. 306 As long as the
initiative process occupies a superior constitutional position, it will
appeal to those who wish to realize their agendas directly without having
to navigate the often "difficult and tortuous" maze of the state
300

Cf id.

See Rossi, 889 P.2d at 574.
See In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 55.
303 Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1189.
304 Id. at 1197.
305 See supra notes 131-145 and accompanying text.
306 See supra notes 109-123 and accompanying text.
301
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. I ature. 307
I egIs
Calls for initiative reform began soon after the initiative process was
created in 1911. 308 This Comment adds to the chorus of those who see
problems with the way the initiative in California is currently constituted
by focusing on a foundational principle of all republican governmentthe separation of powers-and by posing and answering the question of
the effect that this principle should properly have on the initiative power.
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See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
See Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1188.
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